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On the basis ofthree years' intensive observation
of the community and interactions at the Love
Canal in Niagara Falls, NY, the present study
addresses the psychosocial problem ofcreating and
maintaining trust between the residents of an area
contaminated by toxic waste materials and the
government-sponsored scientific researchers and
other health professionals who worked and studied
there (the "scientific professionals"). The problem
is important, for without trust and confidence, no
research involving people's cooperation can be
performed in a scientifically acceptable manner, if
at all.
At Love Canal, because the challenge of main-
taining and increasing initial feelings of trust was
not recognized by the scientific professionals, the
residents' feelings ofuncertainty about their health
and welfare were increased. As their feelings of
uncertainty increased as well about the compe-
tence, wisdom and motivations of government-
sponsored scientific professionals, their initial feel-
ings of respect and confidence in the scientific
professionals changed. A large number became
increasingly suspicious, lost respect for the scien-
tists, reacted angrily, and finally refused to cooper-
ate at all with government-sponsored research. The
scientists themselves suffered from feeling misun-
derstood, unappreciated, ofteninsulted. Someviewed
the people as the "enemy," and finally they were
not able to proceed with "research as usual."
Because the social factors leading to the break-
down oftrust are likely to be present in any region
where a toxic waste dump has contaminated a
residential area and where government-sponsored
researchers study environment and health effects,
I think it is important to understand what hap-
pened at Love Canal.
The problembegins, sociologically speaking, with
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the assumptions, expectations andviewpointsabout
the roles and the behavior of scientists which
existed prior to the actual playing out of the
relationships between the two groups. Scientific
professionals are trained to think analytically. They
try to select narrow problems, communicate chiefly
with each other and do so in precise, technical
terms. They control the quality of their work in
part through cautious interpretations ofdata. Fur-
thermore they do research for its own sake, to
pursue knowledge. Ideally, they are notinvolved or
influenced by anything outside the technical prob-
lem. That is, they are not influenced by financial or
political considerations, or by emotions. Although
we all know that is not entirely true, that disinter-
ested attitude is the ideal for which we strive. The
residents on the other hand, think ofthe problems
as total. For them it is not just a body part that is
involved, but their whole bodies, the bodies oftheir
families, their homes, their lives-all are involved.
The residents of Love Canal were told they might
be living in a dangerous situation and they wanted
information to let them know what to do. They
were uncertain about how to proceed; many felt
they had lost control over important aspects of
theirlives. They expected scientific professionals to
givethemuseful, comprehensibleinformation. They
felt the purpose of research is to help make
decisions, to help people in trouble. Furthermore,
they knew that the decisions that would be made
about their fate-whether or not to clean up the
dump and how, whose homes would be purchased,
who would pay costs, what the outcome oflawsuits
would be, were all dependent, at least in part, upon
the conclusions and the statements of scientific
professionals. They viewed the researchers as
politically involved, as financially involved, and as
influential in the decisions, whether or not the
scientific professionals viewed themselves in that
way.
Finally, while the scientific professionals see
Environmental Health Perspectives
Vol. 48, pp. 15-17, 1983themselves as different from each other, with
different backgrounds, training, specialties and
locations in various government bureaucracies, the
residents viewed them as part ofwhatever agency
they were employed by: the New York Department
ofHealth, the CDC, the EPA or other governmen-
tal agency.
The playing out of relationships between groups
is done through communications both by word and
deed. Examining some events viewed by residents
as key will show how the Love Canal populace was
moved from a point of trust and respect for
scientific professionals, in the spring of1978, to one
of mistrust for them, to the point that they finally
refused to cooperate in further studies in the
summer of 1980, and now no longer believe what
government-sponsored scientific professionals say.
In the spring of 1978, the residents were given
information about the quality of the air in their
basements in the following manner. At a public
meeting, they were handed mimeographed lists
with the names of ten polysyllabic chemicals on
them. Next to the chemical compound names were
numbers representing values for air readings done
in their basements. The people's addresses were
written in at the top of the sheets. After the first
shocked silence, the questions began. When resi-
dents asked whether they could continue to use
theirbasements (many ofwhich were playrooms, or
bedrooms), when they asked whether the numbers
meant there was "a lot ofcontamination," whether
the rest ofthe house was contaminated, the answer
was a repetitious, "We don't know." The scientists
were trying to communicate whattheyhadlearned,
leaving open the question of interpretation. They
could not communicate their own broad context of
understanding. The people interpreted their action
as incomprehensible and responded with fear and
anger.
In August, 1978 the New York Health Commis-
sioner made a crucial announcement. He issued an
official order, declaring the area a hazard to the
health of residents living near the Canal, ordering
health and environmental studies to assess the
damage, and advising that pregnant women and
children under age two move temporarily but as
quickly as possible from the homes bordering the
old canal.
The Commissioner and his staff thought they
were doing their job, for they had preliminary
studies showing excess rates ofmiscarriage among
women at Love Canal, had had their findings
reviewed by experts, and issued a warning they
assumed would involve about 20 families. When I
asked a DOH scientist later what they had planned
to do once the health order was announced, he
replied that as scientists they dealt solely with
health matters, not with social or political ones.
In the city of Niagara Falls however, 300 miles
from the capital in Albany where the Commissioner
made his announcement, the residents of Love
Canal heard the news via the mass media of all
sorts. There was no one in the city to give them
correct, official information, or advice. Hundreds of
Love Canal residents streamed out of their homes
and gathered on the streets. A few started to burn
mortgages; they all shared their fears and organ-
ized a strong citizens' group which they then relied
upon as their intermediary with the world, includ-
ing scientific professionals.
It was in this atmosphere of rush and disorgani-
zation that the health studies of the Love Canal
people expanded. As the autumn and winter wore
on, as the Department ofHealth staffmade numer-
ous phone calls to request information missingfrom
elaborate self-administered questionnaires, as the
results of tests were not forthcoming, as the
rumors flew that collecting 4000 blood samples
within a few weeks had resulted in overloaded
laboratory facilities, as rumors about the presence
of dioxin in the area were at first denied and then
confirmed by the Department of Health, people's
suspicions grew.
While the scientific professionals had tried to
respond to what they suddenly saw as an emergen-
cy, they acted in such a way that their own
professional competence was questioned by the
people. Then, as more and more information about
possible hazards was revealed, people grew suspi-
cious that the extent of the problem was being
concealed to fit the solutions already put in place by
the governor ofNew York, through the purchase of
homes for example, before the extent of the prob-
lem was known.
In February 1979, the Health Commissioner met
with the Love Canal residents and, in discussing
the problem of excess rates of miscarriages, low
birth weights and birth defects, he and others
repeatedly used the term "fetal wastage." Scien-
tists use technical terms for precision and to
remove emotion from the concepts. The people to
whom he spoke however, thought of "fetal wast-
age" as referring to "the baby I lost," "poor little
Nancy with the club foot," "my little son that was
born dead" and the like. They reacted, in short, in
terms of the personal meanings these events had
for them. They were more convinced that the
scientific professional could not understand them.
With a tremendous fanfare ofpublicity, the EPA
announced in the spring of 1980 that a study of
Love Canal residents showed that there was a high
rateofchromosomebreakage amongthe36subjects
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of the research. The people were notified of the
results by teams of EPA scientific professionals
who arrived in Niagara Falls shortly after the news
appeared in the newspapers. Teams of three pro-
fessionals met with each resident who took part in
the study and they also gave them letters describ-
ing the blood study findings.
When I arrived at the Love Canal that day, two
events impressed me immediately. I was greeted
by the mother ofa sick child who hadjust been told
the study results. She held a letter in her hand
describing the chromosome breakage in her blood
sample. She showed it to me and told me that she
had had it all explained but still did not really
understand anything except that she and Love
Canal were somehow responsible for her sick child.
Another woman's shout reached me as I walked in
the building. "I don't care if you only have a half
hour to spend with me! I don't care if you have
more people to see. I don't understand and I want
you to explain this to me until I do." It didn't help
when people learned their time was attenuated
because a press conference had been scheduled
later that day.
Two weeks later, the same people learned that
there was controversy about the meaning of the
chromosome study, when a reporter called from a
New York newspaper and told them about it. One
ofthe women who got the news in this way became
mildly hysterical. Another, the mother of a pro-
foundly retarded child, said that she had planned to
have her tubes tied on the basis of the first report.
Now, she wanted to know, what was she supposed
to do? Whom was she supposed to believe?
In this instance, the control of scientific informa-
tion had gotten completely out of the hands of the
scientific professionals and had become part of the
political bargaining between the federal and the
state levels of government leaders. People tend to
be cynical about politicians, for they see them as
expedient. They do not expect scientists to be
expedient, or to be involved with expedient mea-
sures. As a consequence, the blood chromosome
breakage story and its refutation were seen as the
final straw piled on a huge heap. The organized
Love Canal residents announced in midsummer
1980 that they would simply "boycott" all further
studies undertaken under governmental sponsor-
ship. In this way, they regained some control over
this aspect of the situation.
In the midst of the publicity which followed the
blood chromosome breakage study, in the midst of
criticism of the way in which the scientific profes-
sionals from the state and the federal government
hadhandledthe LoveCanalhealthrelatedresearch,
Governor Carey appointed a high level committee
in June 1980, to review and evaluate all research
done at Love Canal. Dr. Lewis Thomas, Chancellor
of Memorial Sloan-Kettering headed this panel.
The report issued in October 1980 (1) said it was
clear that there was no indication of a variety of
specifically named acute illnesses, and that the
studies of chronic illnesses allowed no firm conclu-
sions to be drawn.
As far as I have been able to determine, there
were no studies available to substantiate these
statements about acute illnesses. The studies of
what were defined as chronic illnesses were inter-
preted in such a way as to ignore, overlook,
downplay, or omit findings suggestive of health
problemsforLove Canalresidents. When Iattempted
to learn about the studies which were the basis for
their conclusions, the Thomas committee members
and chairman refused to answer questions, surely
not a usual scientific collegial response. I later
learned (2) that the governor's own political aides
had helped to shape the final report. Their contri-
butions were unacknowledged in the report.
In this instance, prestigious scientific profession-
als lent their names and the names oftheir eminent
institutions to what was viewed among the Love
Canal residents as a politically inspired cover-up.
The feelings and attitudes of the residents about
the Thomas committee report can best be summed
up by a resident who said: "It's the miracle ofLove
Canal!" She went on to suggest that the world's
toxic wastes should be sentthere forit was the only
place in the world where hundreds of people could
live for years near tons of chemicals and show no
effects whatsoever.
As these few examples suggest, the psychosocial
impact on the relationship of trust between scien-
tist and citizen is important to understand. The
issues gobeyondempiricalinvestigation, andreflect
basic choices for scientists. Participation in the
investigation of highly threatening and controver-
sialproblems, inhighlypoliticized contexts, requires
political sensitivity and awareness and social sensi-
tivity and awareness. There is a basis of trust and
goodwill, but that basis is readily ruptured. To
maintain trust requires that physical scientists
learn how to take into account variables, social and
political, that go beyond those issues that are
normally considered in approaching problems from
one's own necessarily narrow disciplinary perspec-
tive.
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